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Evidence--Declarations of Intention
In Little v. Hower Brake Co., 1 a proceeding for workmen's
compensation, the plaintiff sought to recover for the death of her
husband. The deceased, a traveling salesman employed by the defendant corporation, was killed in an automobile accident outside his
regular selling territory and after his regular working hours. As a
defense the defendant alleged that the deceased at the time of his
death was not acting in the course of his employment, and, therefore,
that the injury was not compensable as it neither arose out of nor
occurred in the course of his employment.2 From a denial of recovery
below, the plaintiff appealed assigning as error the exclusion of
certain statements made by the deceased prior to his death relating
to his purpose in making the trip in question.' These statements
were offered to show that the purpose of the trip was to see customers in nearby towns and thereby establish that the deceased was
acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident.
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding
that such statements were properly excluded because they did not
constitute part of the res gestae.
The court relied on Gassaway v. Gassaway & Owel;, Tnc. 4 where
certain statements made by the deceased two days and one day prior
to his departure, which tended to show that at the time of his death
he was engaged in his work as an employee, were held inadmissible
as not constituting a part of the res gestae.
Although the court decided the principal case solely on the res
gestae exception to the hearsay rule, it recognized that this theory
of admission may not be the only applicable one and possibly "not
as well reasoned as the theory that the declarations are admissible
This "well reasoned theory" is the rule
as original evidence."'
'255 N.C. 451, 121 S.E.2d 889 (1961).
defendant contended that the deceased had left his regular sales
area and was enroute to visit relatives in a nearby town at the time the
accident occurred.
'These, in summary, were: (a) a statement to a customer that the deceased had to "see a customer" in Whiteville, made about nine hours before
leaving on the trip; (b) a statement of the same intent made to a service
station attendant only thirty minutes before his departure; and (c) a statement of similar intent made to his wife over the telephone approximately
thirty minutes before he left.
' 220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E.2d 120 (1942).
5255 N.C. at 455, 121 S.E.2d at 891.
2The

NOTES AND COMMENTS

19621

followed in a growing number of jurisdictions that a declaration by
the deceased of an intent to perform some act is admissible as original evidence to show that the act was performed.6 This rule is
generally recognized as a completely separate exception to the hearsay rule which is in no way connected with the res gestae exception. 7
The landmark case on admission of declarations of intent is
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon s In that case one Valters wrote
letters to his family declaring his intention to leave for Colorado and
other unknown parts with a certain Mr. Hillmon. An unidentified
body which the insurance beneficiaries of Hillmon claimed to be that
of their insured was later found. The insurance company denied
liability, claiming that the deceased man was not Hillmon, but
Walters. The United States Supreme Court held that the letters
were admissible as evidence that Walters had the intention of accompanying I-illmon on the trip. This case established the rule that
declarations of intention could be admitted to show that the act
intended was performed.9 Although some writers feel that its application should be restricted,' 0 Hillmon has been, for the most part,
'By the declaration "a mental state is proved not as an end in itself, but
as a basis for the further inference that the mental state found outlet in
conduct." McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 270, at 571 (1954). See also 6 WIGMoRE, EVIDENcE §

1725 (3d ed. 1940).

"State v. Journey, 115 Conn. 344, 161 AtI. 515 (1932) ; State v. Long,
32 Del. 380, 123 At. 350 (1923); People v. Fritch, 170 Mich. 258, 136 N.W.
493 (1912); State v. Farnam, 82 Ore. 211, 161 Pac. 417 (1916). Start, C.J.,
in a concurring opinion in State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 497, 65 N.W. 63,
70 (1895), stated: "[I]t is relevant to the issue to show that [the deceased]
did meet the defendant, and evidence of her declarations of an intention and
purpose to meet him was admissible as original evidence to prove that she

did in fact intend to meet him ....
To sustain it on ground that the statement of the deceased was part of the res gestae is . . . to assign a wrong

reason for a correct conclusion, which may lead to complications in future
cases." (Emphasis added.) This quotation was cited with approval and
made the basis of the opinion in Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512,
135 At. 301 (1926).

145 U.S. 285 (1892).

o "The letters in question were competent, not as narratives of facts
communicated to the writer by others, nor yet as proof that he actually went
away from Wichita, but as evidence that, shortly before the time when other
evidence tended to show that he went away, he had the intention of going,
and of going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both that he did
go and that he went with Hillmon, than if there had been no proof of such
intention." 145 U.S. at 295-96. (Emphasis added.)
" See, e.g., Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rude, 26 HARv. L.
Rnv. 146 (1912). Limitations have also been placed on this doctrine by
statute. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 65 (1956), which provides
that death or unavailability of the witness furnishes a basis for admission of

declarations evidencing intention of the declarant.
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wholly endorsed by text writers," and is often referred to as the
weight of authority.'

2

Apparently the Hillmon rule has been applied by the North Carolina court in certain situations, yet the court has cited Hilinon in
only one case.'" Perhaps the best example of its application is in
homicide cases where the court has held it reversible error to exclude
declarations of the deceased showing the presence or absence of suicidal intent. 4 Conversely, it has been held error in such cases to
exclude threats by the accused" or by the deceased where they are
corroborative.' 6 Declarations of intention to perform a certain act
have also been allowed to show that the act was or was not performed in the following cases: the making of a contract,17 the signing
20
of a deed,' s the marriage of the parties,'" and the making of a gift.

In admitting this evidence, the court seems to be directly in accord
with the holding in Hillmon.
In accepting the Hillmon rule, the courts of other jurisdictions
have applied it in different situations. Declarations of intention have
been allowed as evidence in the following cases: in homicide cases,
" McCORMICK,

EVIDENcE

§270

(1954); 6

WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

§ 1725

(3d ed. 1940); Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty Three Years After, 38
HARv. L. REv. 709 (1925); McBaine, Admissibility in California of Declarations of Physical or Mental Condition, 19 CALIF. L. REv. 231 (1931); Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31
YALE L. J. 229 (1922).
" In applying the Hillinon rule the court in People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d
177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944), stated that it was following what "is deemed to
be the weight of authority." Although there are specific areas in many
jurisdictions where declarations of intention are admitted, there seems to be
only eleven states which have consistently followed the Hillmon rule in all
areas. These states are Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah.
See Annot., 113 A.L.R. 268, 288 (1938).
"In State v. Davis, 177 N.C. 573, 98 S.E. 785 (1919), the court cited
language directly from Hillmon, apparently with some degree of approval, but
decided the case by use of the old standby, the res gestae.
' State v. Lagerholm, 208 N.C. 195, 179 S.E. 664 (1935) ; State v. Prytle,
191 N.C. 698, 132 S.E. 785 (1926). It is of interest to note that in State v.

Prytle the court relied on Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31
N.E. 961 (1892), wherein Hillmon was cited.
" State v. Shook, 224 N.C. 728, 32 S.E.2d 329 (1944); State v. Allen,
222 N.C. 145, 22 S.E.2d 233 (1942). See generally STA SBuRy, NoRH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 162 (1946).
1 State v. Dickey, 206 N.C. 417, 174 S.E. 316 (1934);
State v. Exum,
138 TN.C. 599, 50 S.E. 283 (1905).
' Poindexter v. McCannon, 16 N.C. 373 (1830).
1 Summerlin v. Cowles, 101 N.C. 473, 7 S.E. 881 (1888).
10 Forbes v. Burgess, 158 N.C. 131, 73 S.E. 792 (1912).

'0Bynum v. Fidelity Bank, 219 N.C. 109, 12 S.E.2d 898 (1941).

1962]
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to show an intent to go to a certain place,2 or to commit suicide,22
or to show that the killing was necessitated by self-defense ;23 in murder by abortion cases, to show an intention to submit to the operation;24 in wills cases, to show an intent to exclude a certain person
as a beneficiary, or to destroy or alter a will;2 and in insurance
cases declarations of the insured have been admitted to identify the
proper beneficiary where the beneficiary named in the policy was
ambiguous.2
Declarations of intention have also been admitted to
show that the declarant actually made the intended trip ;"8 that he
delivered the deed or made the gift of which he spoke;29 that he
changed his domicile with intent to remain outside the jurisdiction ;3o
and that he went to the intended place. 1
There are also a great number of workmen's compensation cases
in which declarations of intention have been allowed to show that
the employee was acting in the scope of his employment at the time
of the accident. 2
21 State v. Journey, 115 Conn. 344, 161 At. 515 (1932) ; Shirley v. State,
168 Ga. 344, 148 S.E. 91 (1929); State v. Vial, 153 La. 883, 96 So. 796

(1923).

" Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N.E. 961 (1892) ; State
v. Ilgenfritz, 263 Mo. 615, 173 S.W. 1041 (1915).
23 State v. Long, 2 Del. 380, 123 At. 350 (1923);
State v. Farnam, 82
Ore. 211, 161 Pac. 417 (1916).
" People v. Northcott, 46 Cal. App. 706, 189 Pac. 704 (Dist. Ct. App.
1920); People v. Fritch, 170 Mich. 258, 136 N.W. 493 (1912); State v.
Paschall,
182 Wash. 304, 47 P.2d 15 (1935).
25
Atherton v. Gaslin, 194 Ky. 460, 239 S.W. 771 (1922); Buchanan v.
Davis, 12 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
" It re Estate of Oates, [1946] 2 All E.R. 735; In re Layer's Estate,
[1957] 21 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 209, 10 D.L.R.2d 279 (Sask.).
"'John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Menson,*97 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.
Ark. 1951); Crawford v. Center, 193 Ark. 287, 100 S.W.2d 83 (1936).
. 8 Wibye v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Lake Shore
Ry.20v.Feore
Herrick,
49 Ohio St. 25, 29 N.E. 1052 (1892).
v. Trammel,
213 Ala. 293, 104 So. 808 (1925) ; Walters v. Lawler, 297 Ill. 63, 130 N.E. 335 (1921); Kessler v. Von Bank, 144 Minn. 220,
174 N.W. 839 (1919).
" King v. McCarthy, 54 Minn. 190, 55 N.W. 960 (1893); Wilbur v.
Calais, 90 Vt. 335, 98 Atl. 913 (1916).
"Southern Ry. v. Tudor, 46 Ga. App. 563, 168 S.E. 98 (1933) ; Parker
v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 68, 238 S.W. 943 (1921).
" See, e.g., Alexander Film Co. v. Industrial Commn, 136 Colo. 486, 319
P.2d 1074 (1957); Lewis v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 247
S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1952); Ervin v. Myrtle Grove Plantation, 206 S.C. 41, 32
S.E.2d 877 (1945); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 174 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943); Prater v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 83 S.W.2d 1038 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935).
In Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 119 Conn. 483, 177 At. 524
(1935), the court admitted declarations of the deceased employee to show
that he was actually working along a certain road where the accident occurred. In admitting this testimony the court quoted State v. Journey, 115
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American Sec. Co. v. Minard,3 which is directly on point with
the Little case, allowed as evidence statements made by the deceased
prior to his accident tending to show that he was acting in the scope
of his employment at the time of the accident. This case, and others
so holding, have allowed these declarations, not under any pretenses
of the res gestae, but under the Hillmon rule. Some courts, although
not allowing these declarations as original evidence under Hillmon,
will still allow them to corroborate other evidence which tends to
prove or disprove the fact in issue. 4
The argument in favor of admission of declarations of intention
as another exception to the hearsay rule is quite strong. Proponents
of the Hillmon doctrine point out that if it is properly limited,"5
there is no more danger of allowing improper evidence than with
any other exception to the hearsay rule. In many cases, where the
declaration of the declarant is the only direct evidence bearing on
the issue, its necessity is apparent.
The uncertainty in North Carolina has arisen not from any
complete denunciation by the court of the Hillmon rule, but from the
application of it in some cases, such as the homicide cases, and not
in others, such as the principal case. 6 No doubt this results from
the fact that the court feels this area is adequately covered by the
Conn. 344, 351, 161 Ati. 515, 517 (1932), to the effect that "'a declaration

indicating a present intention to do a particular act in the immediate future,

made in apparent good faith and not for self-serving purposes, is admissible

to prove that the act was in fact performed. It is admissible, not as part of
the res gestae but as a fact relevant to the fact in issue."' 119 Conn. at 490,
177 Atl. at 528.
" 118 Ind. App. 310, 77 N.E.2d 762 (1948). See also Indiana Steel
Prods. Co. v. Leonard, 126 Ind. App. 669, 131 N.E.2d 162 (1956). Both
of these cases cited Hilfnon as the basis for the admission of the declaration
of the deceased employee.
"'Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cardillo, 106 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1939)
(based on statutory interpretation); Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463,
46 N.E.2d 886 (1943). It is pointed out in LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 29.73 (1952), that the trend seems to be to allow these declarations in corroboration either by statutory amendment or judicial decision.
" People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944), the court set
up the following requirements for the admissibility of such declarations under
the Hili non rule: (a) that the declaration must tend to prove the declarant's
intention at the time it was made; (b) that it must have been made under
circumstances which naturally give verity to the utterance; and (c) that it
must be relevant to the issue in the case. See generally 6 WIGMORE, EviDENCCE § 1725 (3d ed. 1940).
6 It should be noted that the Hillvion rule was never directly presented
to the court in the principal case, as this case was not cited by the appellant.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 3-9, Little v. Hower Brake Co., 255 N.C. 451, 121
S.E.2d 889 (1961).
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res gestae doctrine. However, the res gestae doctrine is not adequate
in cases like the principal case where the application of the Hillmon
rule might have given some potentially valuable information to the
jury.
It is submitted that the North Carolina court should accept the
Hillmon doctrine completely by extending it beyond its present
limited scope in this state to cover such cases as the principal case.
CARL

A.

BARRINGTON, JR.

Mortgages-Absolute Deeds Construed As Security Transactions
In Isley v. Browmt' the plaintiffs sought to have an absolute deed
of conveyance construed as a security for a debt. The plaintiffs
contended that they had signed the deed with the understanding
that the defendant, the grantee under the deed, would pay off an
indebtedness and allow them to repay him in monthly installments.
On appeal to the supreme court a judgment for the plaintiffs was
reversed (1) because of plaintiffs' failure to allege and prove that
the clause of redemption was omitted by mistake and (2) because of
plaintiffs' negligence in failing to read the instrument of conveyance
before signing it.
Generally, a deed of conveyance, although absolute on its face,
will be construed as a mortgage if it is given as security for a debt
and if the property was intended by the parties to stand as security.2
In the majority of jurisdictions this rule follows upon proof that the
parties intended a security transaction. 3 However, North Carolina
has long required, in addition to proof of an intent to create a security, that it be shown that the clause of redemption was omitted
by reason of ignorance, mistake, fraud or undue advantage. Moreover, the former had to be shown by facts and circumstances dehors
the deed.'
In the principal case the Court, in giving its first reason for
reversal, stated that in order for the grantor of the absolute deed to
N.C. 791, 117 S.E.2d 821 (1961).
'See, e.g., Hill v. Day, 231 Ark. 550, 331 S.W.2d 38 (1960). See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R. 937 (1932); Note 26 N.C.L. REv. 405. (1948).
1253

See, e.g., Newell v. Pate, 264 Ala. 644, 89 So. 2d 170 (1956).
'See, e.g., Perkins v. Perkins, 249 N.C. 152, 105 S.E.2d 663 (1958) ; for
cases prior to 1939, see Notes, 26 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1948); 16 N.C.L. REv.
416 (1938). See also Jones v. Brinson, 231 N.C. 63, 55 S.E.2d 808 (1949)
(parel trust); Williams v. Joines, 228 N.C. 141, 44 S.E.2d 738 (1947)
(action for specific performance).

